State of Utah v. Kent William Blanchard : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
State of Utah v. Kent William Blanchard : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Christine Soltis; Criminal Appeals Division; Attorneys for Appellee.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold and Wiggins; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Kent William Blanchard: Brief of Appellant, No. 981044 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1641
COPY 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD, 
Defendant / Appellant, 
Case No. 980044-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment and Commitment to the Utah 
State Prison of theft, a felony of the third 
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
404 in the Second Judicial District Court in and 
for Davis County, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
presiding. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
SCOTT L WIGGINS - Bar No. 582 0 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 328-4333 
(801) 328-4351 (Facsimile) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 2 3 1998 
Julia D'Alesendro 
Clerk of the Court 
COPY 
SCOTT L WIGGINS, Bar No. 5820 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-4333 
Facsimile: (801)328-4351 
Attorneys for Defendant / Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, ] 
V. 
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD, ] 
Defendant / Appellant. ) 
) Case No. 980044-CA 
NOTICE OF ERRATA 
COMES NOW Defendant / Appellant, Kent William Blanchard, by and through 
counsel, Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, P.C, and files this Notice of 
Errata in the Brief of Appellant previously filed with this Court on October 23, 1998. In 
the course of preparing Statement of Fact No. 7 as contained in the Statement of Facts 
section of the Brief of Appellant, Counsel for Defendant / Appellant inadvertently left out 
lines 5 and 6 of page 191 of the Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, which 
FILED 
yt-aib ^ niirt of Aopeals 
Julia DASesandro 
rjwk rtf the Cmitt 
contains an additional objection of Defendant to the imposition, amount, and distribution 
'? l;irt KM> u i 
Statement of Fact No. ? is as follows: 
DEFENDANT: 'Cause I figure I owe him about $500. Chat was stated 
in the original phone conversation. 
Th of the Brief of Appellant, for purposes 
of accuracy, should read as follows: 
THE COURT: 
7. In the course of the discussion between the trial court and 
counsel as well as Defendant about the amount of restitution, the following 
exchange took place: 
Well, let me tell you that I would probably order 
a restitution in this case, in that if it wants to be 
different from that or argued, I would argue that 
restitution of the $1,821 for the three checks, 
less an offset for the last payroll check that he's 
due. So it would the five hundred ~ what is it, 
thirty-one? 
Seventeen. 
So it would 1,821 minus $517. So it would be 
$1,304. 
Yes. 
Your honor, the victim here, Paul Howard, gave 
an itemized statement to the Court, and it 
totaled $1,300. The $600 out of the $1,821 that 
you've mentioned was actually given for topsoil 
or it went toward topsoil, was paid off, as I 
understood. 
Well, my understanding is that he got a check 
for that topsoil already. This is money that he 
received from Mrs. Crimins for this job, went 
DEFENDANT. 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
THE HUH IT 
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MR. ALBRIGHT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
THE COURT: 
in, and should have been paid to Landscape 
Express. I mean, I believe that the Court --
Do you want to have a hearing, or do we want 
to it — I mean. 
I think that's better the way the Court did it. 
The $1,821 minus — 
With an offset for the — 
Last week's wages. 
And then both parties need to be advised, this 
doesn't affect any civil claim one way — 
Anything for overtime or any of that stuff will 
have to be dealt with separately. 
You can still sue. 
Not from incarceration you can't. 
You need to let the Court know if you feel 
comfortable — 
Your order then, would actually be for ~ 
'Cause I it should be — he should not be entitled 
to earn a profit on the side jobs where I did all 
the labor myself. If he's only out thirteen 
hundred and something dollars in materials and 
labor, as you're claiming, then my $500 should 
be subtracted from that and difference should be 
paid to him. 
I wonder if we could ask him — 
'Cause I figure I owe him about $500. That was 
stated in the original phone conversation. 
Well, if he's willing to accept that, I mean — 
Why don't we find out from Mr. Howard if he's 
willing to accept the -- it would actually take it 
down to about $800 and something, the thirteen 
that he asked for minus — 
It would be, what, $1,369? 
MR. ALBRIGHT: $1,369. 
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THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
MR. HARWARD: In the context of restitution in a criminal case, 
he would accept a restitution order for the 
amount, the $1,300 that he --
$1,369. 
~ less the — 
$517. 
Yes. However, here's something he's going — 
the tools and things that you're holding for 
collateral, he wants to know if he can get 
permission, some way of getting recovery the ~ 
I have a $30 trailer hitch, but its locked in the 
back of a storage unit, so . . . 
Okay. If I could — 
I could send him a check for 30 bucks 
sometime. 
Do you want to add 30 onto ~ 
Can we add that on? 
MR. ALBRIGHT: You keep the hitch. 
MR. HARWARD: Okay. 
DEFENDANT: I don't have any other tools. 
MR. HARWARD: Okay. 
(R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 189-192). The trial court, 
after this exchange, immediately sentenced Defendant and, in the course of so 
doing, imposed restitution in the amount of $882, to which Defendant objected to 
in the course of the exchange (See id. at pp. 192 and 191, lines 5-6); 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
(Italicized and bold emphasis added to show correction). 
DATED this 29th day of October, 1998. 
WIGGINS, P.C. 
Attorney sior Defendant / Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MATTJNG 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF ERRATA to the 
following, on this 29th day of October, 1998: 
Ms. Catherine M. Johnson 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, U;Tg4W-fl854 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court, in light of Defendant's objection 
to the imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution, committed 
plain error by failing to allow Defendant a full hearing on the issue 
of restitution. The appellate court "will not vacate an order of 
restitution unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded 
its authority." State v. Westerman, 945 P. 2d 695, 696 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (citing State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) and State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)). However, if the trial court's order or restitution is based 
on statutory interpretation, the appellate court affords the trial 
court's determination no deference and reviews it for correctness. 
Id. (citing Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)).x 
In the course of the trial court's determination to impose 
restitution, Defendant objected to the imposition, amount, and 
distribution of restitution (See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held 
December 26, 1997, pp. 190-91 and p. 191, lines 5-6). Defendant's 
appointed trial counsel failed to object to the trial court's failure 
to allow Defendant a "full hearing," even though appointed trial 
counsel apparently recognized the need for hearing and even though 
Defendant clearly objected to the imposition, amount, and 
distribution of the contemplated restitution (See R. 52, Transcript 
of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p. 190, lines 7-8). In the event 
that this issue is deemed to have not been raised sufficiently by 
virtue of appointed trial counsel's failure to object, this issue, 
for the reasons stated below, presents circumstances constituting 
xIn the instant case, the trial court apparently determined that 
a hearing on Defendant's objections to the imposition of restitution 
was not necessary notwithstanding appointed trial counsel's inquiry, 
"Do you want to have a hearing, or do we want to it -- I mean." (See 
R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1998, p. 190, lines 7-
8) . 
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plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
2. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by-
failing to timely object and request that the trial court allow 
Defendant a full hearing on the imposition, amount, or distribution 
of restitution, thereby denying Defendant of his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel. To make such a showing, 
Defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance, falling below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064 (1984); see also State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 
1996). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in passim 
Article I, section 7, Utah Constitution in passim 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Information filed October 20, 1997, Defendant was 
charged with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404. Defendant waived a preliminary hearing. 
Thereafter, Defendant was arraigned on December 2, 1997, at which 
time he pleaded not guilty. On December 26, 1997, Defendant appeared 
before the trial court for a nonjury trial. Thereafter, the trial 
court, without taking the case under advisement, found Defendant 
guilty as charged. The trial court then sentenced Defendant to zero 
to five years in the Utah State Prison. In addition, the trial 
court, without hearing, ordered restitution in the amount of $882.00. 
Defendant objected to the amount of restitution. 
On December 26, 1997, the trial court signed the Judgment and 
Commitment to the Utah State Prison, which was entered that same day. 
Defendant, through appointed appellate counsel, subsequently filed 
Notice of Appeal on January 22, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The instant appeal arises out a case involving Defendant's 
employment with Landscape Express, Inc., and its owner, Mr. Paul 
Howard (R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 9-11). 
In fact, Mr. Howard had offered Defendant an ownership position in 
the business and was in the process of having the appropriate 
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paperwork prepared to effectuate the same (Id. at R. 52, p. 11, lines 
6-18);2 
2. During the course of previously mentioned employment and 
imminent ownership in the business, Defendant performed some side 
work on a job in Kaysville, Utah (Id. at R. 52, p. 115, lines 15-17); 
3. Defendant, by way of Information filed October 20, 1997, 
was charged with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 (Information, R. 1-2). The Information alleged 
that Defendant "exercised unauthorized control" over the property of 
Landscape Express, Inc., in the course of performing the side work 
and failed to reimburse Landscape Express, Inc., for the same (Id.); 
4. Defendant subsequently waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing (see Bind-Over Order, R. 8) , after which he pleaded not 
guilty to the charge at the arraignment hearing held on December 2, 
1997 (Minute Entry Notice, R. 11-12); 
5. On December 26, 1997, Defendant appeared before the trial 
court for a nonjury trial (Minute Entry, R. 13) . Upon completion of 
the trial, the trial court, without taking the case under advisement, 
found Defendant guilty as charged (Id. at R. 15-16; Transcript of 
Trial, R. 52, p. 188); 
2Contrary to Mr. Howard's assertion, Defendant testified at trial 
that the nature of the relationship between Mr. Howard and himself 
was that of a partnership (See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held 
December 26, 1997, pp. 108-09) . 
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6. Immediately thereafter, the trial court sentenced Defendant 
to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison (Judgment and 
Commitment to Utah State Prison, R. 18) . In addition, the trial 
court, without a hearing, ordered restitution in the amount of 
$882.00 (Transcript of Trial, R. 52, pp. 189-93). Defendant, 
himself, objected to the amount of restitution (Id. at R. 52, pp. 
190-91); 
7. In the course of the discussion between the trial court and 
counsel as well as Defendant about the amount of restitution, the 
following exchange took place: 
THE COURT: 
DEFENDANT: 
Well, let me tell you that I would probably 
order a restitution in this case, in that 
if it wants to be different from that or 
argued, I would argue that restitution of 
the $1,821 for the three checks, less an 
offset for the last payroll check that he's 
due. So it would the five hundred -- what 
is it, thirty-one? 
Seventeen. 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
THE COURT: 
So it would 1,821 minus $517. So it would 
be $1,304. 
Yes 
Your honor, the victim here, Paul Howard, 
gave an itemized statement to the Court, 
and it totaled $1,300. The $600 out of the 
$1,821 that you've mentioned was actually 
given for topsoil or it went toward 
topsoil, was paid off, as I understood. 
Well, my understanding is that he got a 
check for that topsoil already. This is 
money that he received from Mrs. Crimins 
for this job, went in, and should have been 
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MR. ALBRIGHT: 
paid to Landscape Express, 
believe that the Court --
I mean, I 
Do you want to have a hearing, or do we 
want to it -- I mean. 
MR. HARWARD: I think that's better the way the Court did 
it. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: The $1,821 minus --
MR. HARWARD: With an offset for the 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
Last week's wages. 
And then both parties need to be advised, 
this doesn't affect any civil claim one way 
THE COURT: Anything for overtime or any of that stuff 
will have to be dealt with separately. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: You can still sue. 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
DEFENDANT: 
Not from incarceration you can't. 
You need to let the Court know if you feel 
comfortable --
Your order then, would actually be for --
'Cause I it should be -- he should not be 
entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs 
where I did all the labor myself. If he's 
only out thirteen hundred and something 
dollars in materials and labor, as you're 
claiming, then my $500 should be subtracted 
from that and difference should be paid to 
him. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I wonder if we could ask him -• 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
Well, if he's willing to accept that, I 
mean --
Why don't we find out from Mr. Howard if 
he's willing to accept the -- it would 
actually take it down to about $8 0 0 and 
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THE COURT: 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
DEFENDANT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
DEFENDANT: 
something, the thirteen that he asked for 
minus --
It would be, what, $1,369? 
$1,369. 
In the context of restitution in a criminal 
case, he would accept a restitution order 
for the amount, the $1,3 00 that he --
$1,369. 
-- less the --
$517. 
Yes. However, here's something he's going 
-- the tools and things that you're holding 
for collateral, he wants to know if he can 
get permission, some way of getting 
recovery the --
I have a $30 trailer hitch, but its locked 
in the back of a storage unit, so . . . 
Okay. If I could --
I could send him a check for 3 0 bucks 
sometime. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Do you want to add 3 0 onto --
MR. HARWARD: Can we add that on? 
MR. ALBRIGHT: You keep the hitch. 
MR. HARWARD: Okay. 
DEFENDANT: I don't have any other tools. 
MR. HARWARD: Okay. 
(R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, pp. 189-192). 
The trial court, after this exchange, immediately sentenced Defendant 
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and, in the course of so doing, imposed restitution in the amount of 
$882, to which Defendant objected to in the course of the exchange 
(See id. at pp. 192 and 191, lines 5-6); 
8. On December 26, 1997, the trial court signed the Judgment 
and Commitment to the Utah State Prison, which was entered that same 
day (R. 18, Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison). In 
the Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term of 0-5 years and ordered Defendant to pay restitution in the 
amount of $882.00 (Id.); 
9. Defendant, through appointed appellate counsel, filed 
Notice of Appeal on January 22, 1998 (R. 19-21, Notice of Appeal). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In light of Defendant's clear objection to the imposition, 
amount, and distribution of restitution, the trial court committed 
error, both plain and otherwise, by failing to allow defendant a full 
hearing on the issue of restitution. By failing to allow Defendant 
a "full hearing" on his objections with regard to the amount of 
restitution, the trial court denied Defendant of his right to 
procedural due process; 
2. By failing to timely object to and request a "full hearing" 
on the imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution, appointed 
trial counsel denied Defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the 
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effective assistance of counsel. Appointed trial counsel's failure 
to timely object and request a "full hearing" fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (e) . But for counsel's 
deficient performance of failing to object, the outcome or amount of 
court-ordered restitution would have been different. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. IN LIGHT OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE IMPOSITION, 
AMOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED ERROR, BOTH PLAIN AND OTHERWISE, BY 
FAILING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT A FULL HEARING ON THE ISSUE 
OF RESTITUTION; THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (e) provides that Mi]f the 
defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue." (Emphasis added). See State 
v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Subsection 
(8)(c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 further requires the trial court 
to take into account certain factors in determining the monetary sum 
and other conditions for court-ordered restitution. Id. at 1288. 
The factors to be considered are as follows: 
(i) the financial resources of the 
defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the 
other obligations of the defendant; 
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(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court 
determines make restitution inappropriate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (c) . Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(d)(i) requires that the trial court makes its decisions for 
ordering restitution a part of the "court record." 
In the instant case, during the court's discussion with counsel 
about the imposition of restitution, Defendant objected to the 
imposition, amount, and distribution of restitution by arguing that 
Mr. Howard "should not be entitled to earn a profit on the side jobs 
where [Defendant] did all the labor [himself]." (See R. 52, 
Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1998, p. 190, lines 23-25). 
Defendant further expressed his objection by asserting he only owed 
Mr. Howard "about $500", which Mr. Howard had previously admitted 
during a telephone conversation with Defendant. (See id. at R. 52, p. 
191, lines 5-6). However, if this Court determines that the issue or 
objection concerning the imposition, amount, or distribution is 
raised for the first time on appeal, the circumstances surrounding 
this issue constitute plain error. Ordinarily, the failure to raise 
a timely objection to matter at trial constitutes waiver of the issue 
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on appeal unless the circumstances surrounding the issue constitute 
plain error. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992). 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court outlined the following principles involved in determining 
whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain 
error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
the appellant must show the following: (i) An 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); and State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). According to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 
1989) , "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' [found 
in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain error7 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) . . . ." 
The trial court, upon Defendant clearly expressing his objection 
to the imposition, amount, and distribution of the contemplated 
restitution, erred, both plainly and otherwise, by failing to allow 
Defendant a full hearing on Defendant's objections to restitution. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-201 (4) (e) ; Haga, 954 P.2d at 1289; cf. 
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Monson v. Carver, 928 P. 2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) .3 Not only did the 
trial court's failure to allow Defendant a "full hearing" on the 
restitution issue deny Defendant of his right to a "full hearing" 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (e) , the trial court's failure also 
denied Defendant of his constitutional right to due process. See 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State v. Rawlings, 892 
P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "xTimely and adequate notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart 
of procedural fairness.'" Rawlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (quoting Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted)). 
"
X[A]11 parties are entitled to notice that a particular issue is 
being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence 
and argument on that issue before decision.'" Id. (quoting Plumb v. 
State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990)). "The failure to give adequate 
notice and opportunity to participate can constitute a denial of due 
process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution."4 Plumb, 
809 P.2d at 743. 
3The trial court failed to allow Defendant a full hearing on 
Defendant's objections to the imposition of restitution 
notwithstanding appointed trial counsel's inquiry, "Do you want to 
have a hearing, or do we want to do it -- I mean." (See R. 52, 
Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p. 190, lines 7-8). 
4Article I, section 7, of the Utah State Constitution provides 
that " [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." 
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In addition, the trial court, in determining the monetary sum of 
the court-ordered restitution, failed to consider the requisite 
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (c) . See also 
Monson, 928 P.2d 1028. Furthermore, the trial court erred by failing 
to make its decisions as to why restitution was appropriate a part of 
the "court record." See id. 
With respect to whether the error was harmful, it should be 
noted that the evidence presented during trial was vague and 
ambiguous as to the amounts allegedly owed by Defendant as a result 
of the Crimins side-job. In fact, evidence was presented at trial 
that Landscape Express, Inc., owes Defendant approximately $2,370 in 
overtime pay, (see R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, 
p. 114, lines 23-24), and that Defendant submitted copies of payroll 
checks as evidence of such (See id. at R. 52, p. 115, lines 8-14). 
The trial court's calculation of the monetary restitution sum for 
court-ordered restitution was, in fact, based on the self-serving 
testimony and calculation of Mr. Howard (See id. at R. 52, p. 189-
91). Consequently, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the 
errors a different result in terms of the amount of restitution would 
have occurred. 
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II. BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT TO AND REQUEST A HEARING 
ON THE IMPOSITION, AMOUNT, AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESTITUTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL 
DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), 
the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test for 
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment5 right to effective 
assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 
2 064. Utah courts adopted this test, which follows: "To prevail, a 
defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Bundy 
v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord State v. Templin, 
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T]he 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for 
its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 
364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
5The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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In order to meet the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"
xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). 
A defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994); Frame, 723 P.2d at 
405. In the process of arriving at this determination, the appellate 
court "should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire 
evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the 
verdict is supported by the record." Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
In the instant case, appointed trial counsel's failure to timely 
object to the trial court's imposition, amount, and distribution of 
19 
restitution fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (e) . Section 76-3-
201(4) (e) states, "If the defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."' 
(Emphasis added). State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (remanding case to the trial court for required restitution 
hearing and "to enter such order thereon as may be appropriate"); cf. 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996) (recognizing 
requisite "full hearing" on objections to restitution). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to timely object to and 
request the requisite restitution hearing fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment in light of the plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e), and the aforementioned 
Utah case law.6 But for counsel's deficient performance of failing 
to object, there would likely have been a different determination as 
to the amount of court-ordered restitution. 
6In fact, appointed trial counsel's remarks during the discussion 
of restitution after trial indicate that appointed trial counsel was 
apparently aware of the need for a full hearing on the restitution 
matter (See R. 52, Transcript of Trial Held December 26, 1997, p. 
190, lines 7-8). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court vacate the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court and 
remand the case to the trial court to hold a restitution hearing and 
enter the appropriate order based on the evidence presented at that 
hearing and for further proceedings consistent with this Court's 
directions as stated in its opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and 
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with restitution, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and due process, which are matters 
of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
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Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jjfjl day of O c t o b e r , 1998, 
Sc WIGGINS, P . C . 
A t t o r n e y s J f o r A p p e l l a n t 
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ADDENDUM 
Addenda A: Judgment and Commitment to the Utah State Prison 
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Addendum A 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ULC tlu—0 '•i hi Ji— 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
KENT WILLIAM BLANCHARD, 
Defendant(s). 
COMMITMENT TO UTAH^1 
STATE PRISONy/K^S__„ 
Case No. 971701327 
Whereas, the above-named defendant, having been convicted or plead guilty- to the 
crime(s) of Theft, a felony of the Third degree and now being present in Court accompanied 
by his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon the Court renders it judgment. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: The 
defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years. 
Court Recommendations: The charge is to run concurrent with present charges. 
Restitution is ordered in the amount of $882.00 and a public defender fee is ordered in the 
amount of $250.00. 
Dated this 26th day of December, 1997, with the Seal of the Court affixed 
hereto. 
BY THE COURT: 
* * * * * * * « « " 
, ^ 
Q < » V ^ ( T V . ( T \ Q A ^ ^ 
Jon M. Memmott 
District Court Judge 
PAULA CARR 
CLERK OF COURT 
$gjuAaU-(nJyrr}\ 
Laura M. Arbon 
Deputy Clerk 
